Poesis of Objecthood-Part Nine-Full Version

Full version of part nine of Poesis of Objecthood, an essay written with a mix of private journal and public statement, on the ontological relevance of objects.

Ely Tahan

11/19/202636 min read

9.1

The fly repeatedly strikes the transparent walls of the glass bottle that imprisons it, buzzing almost inaudibly because the hefty stopper keeps it captive. Mired in this context, it cannot apprehend the enclosure that conditions its movements until Wittgenstein shows it the way out by helping it recognize that its troublesome condition stems from the way it was approached. He does not defeat the error by constructing a superior representation of reality but tries to prevent certain configurations from acquiring their power to cast a spell, as he conveys by his recurrent vocabulary of being bewitched by language or held in capture by a picture, not knowing one’s way about and needing to be shown the way out of a confining perspective or bind. The fly experiences the bottle as a fait accompli, and the undeniable condition of its existence because of its exhaustive ubiquity, but its containment is constituted through relations among language, concepts, habits, expectations, and practices. It mistakes the bottle for the apparent solidity of an entitative condition that conceals those original relations and replaces them with the placid façade of a Potemkin village. Wittgenstein’s gesture is more modest than a critique that can establish another privileged explanation of facts, but perhaps more radical than the philosopher with the correct metalanguage, because it instigates a seminal recognition without an epistemological conquest. This introduces a salient distinction between having to explain something and rearranging what is already known about it so that it may be approached differently. Since misprision leads to captivity, such a reappraisal can cause an anagnorisis that actualizes the trapped fly’s release. The ocular metaphors that are infrastructural to language provide an elementary instance of this kind of captivity and a picture of what knowing is or ought to be. To see is to understand; to look is to inquire; a lens becomes a cognitive filter; arguments are clear or obscure; we acquire insight, adopt a viewpoint, bring things into focus, or shed light upon them. While seemingly innocuous, the trouble is that these arrangements begin to feel as if they describe cognition itself rather than a historically constructed way of speaking about it. Metaphysics are smuggled through harmless words, and to dislodge the ocular metaphor that has hardened into an unnoticed cognitive architecture, we may exercise more authentic sensory references such as to grasp, which introduces the hand; to follow, which brings in locomotion; resonance, which involves acoustics; and digesting an idea, which includes the adumbrated notion of metabolism. But what these alternatives also reveal is that the misprision lies in forgetting one inhabits a particular metaphor. As an enormous epistemological vocabulary repeats the same scopic topology, the challenge becomes preventing one metaphorical regime from becoming so invisible that its relational organization masquerades as the natural structure of reality. Modern ocular metaphors imagine vision as strangely frictionless, but in Lucretius’ account, for instance, seeing functions as an exchange across a gap rather than a sovereign apprehension from a distance. Perception is not the detached possession of a distant object by a sovereign eye, but the transduction across an interval in which something passes between entities without abolishing their separation. Thus, averting the relational arrangements that have acquired the coercive implementation of necessity, Wittgenstein’s apotropaic intervention yields the important Lucretian counterpoint and unsettles the apparent solidity, authority, and natural assertion of a mere construct. As an immediate consequence, it becomes apparent that to look for an explanation borrows the grammar of searching for a misplaced thing, quietly suggesting that explanations already exist somewhere, waiting to be found, when instead, finding an explanation could involve building a relation, recognizing a pattern, or rearranging things until they become mutually intelligible. The same demystification and redistributive task is involved in the plowing of the ritual field, which consists neither in privileging entitative objects over relational ones nor in subordinating entities to the relations through which they become perceptible, but in ensuring their respective integrity and uncoerced cadence. The bewildered fly eventually stops mistaking the bottle’s glass for the limits of its universe as what was considered given or natural turns out to be a configuration whose origins have disappeared in common use.

9.2

Edward Said warned against the prejudice inherent in the anthropologist’s and ethnographer’s assessment of a foreign culture. Not because it may contain individual bias, but because systems of knowledge can produce classifications with an apparent neutrality that conceals the position and power of the classifier. Orientalism reminds the observer that the observational apparatus itself has a cultural history. Acknowledging this bias, Philippe Descola elaborates a theoretical quadrant that distinguishes four ontologies based on perceived similarities and differences in interiority and physicality between humans and nonhumans. To avoid strict taxonomic rigidity, these different ways of inhabiting the world may not so much determine as indicate four divergent proclivities arranged in an ontological protractor wheel, contrasting naturalism with animism and totemism with analogism. In the former pairing, animism shares the interiority of the beings involved, whereas naturalism shares only their exteriority, leaving their interiority radically different. The latter is the dominant Western worldview, at the antipode of the animistic realm of animals, plants, and objects endowed with agency, intentionality, and social standing. The second pairing contrasts totemism, in which the members of a group, whether humans or nonhumans, share both physical and interior qualities, and analogism, in which they share none. The former expresses heraldry and continuity through species, ancestry, and other common attributes, and the latter expresses heterogeneous correspondences among differentiated beings. These modes of identification do not preclude hybridization, as a contemporary person can be overwhelmingly naturalistic when visiting a doctor, analogistic when consulting astrology, animistic when talking to a malfunctioning computer, and arguably totemistic when manifesting identity through ancestry, emblems, and collective affiliations. What matters is that Descola uses this fourfold scheme to make Western naturalism itself ethnographically visible. Naturalism does not assert itself as a particular ontology but becomes homologous to knowledge and reality. From its privileged perspective, animism is naïve belief, analogism superstition, and totemism, primitive classification. But by differentiating them as specific ontologies, Descola can reveal naturalism’s hidden roots and dynamite its safest assumptions. Just as Wittgenstein demonstrates that what appears to be a necessity is, in fact, the language-game through which the problem is formulated. This demystification runs counter to the normalization that naturalism assumes when it suppresses these sister tendencies and prevents them from entering into dialogue with each other. The positions on the ontological protractor wheel can then be treated not as descriptions of what entities are, but as recurrent relational strategies through which they become intelligible.

The persistence of animistic, totemistic, and analogistic tendencies within predominantly naturalistic societies is often treated as archaism, but their recurrence suggests a wider range of possibilities for how entitative and relational objects may engage. Attributing personality to a cranky old machine, investing ancestral presence in an heirloom, symbolically identifying with the colors of a flag, or experiencing a landscape as an interlocutor does not necessarily entail abandoning naturalism. Different ontological orientations can coexist, overlap, and become activated through particular encounters. Their hybridization consequently acquires more than multicultural significance, revealing the ritual field's irreducibility to any single system of relational organization. But while naturalistic societies can account for animistic, totemistic, or analogistic relations, their official ontology struggles to explain them without redescribing them as metaphor, projection, sentimentality, fetishism, or error. Naturalism can explain why someone experiences a river as an ancestor by examining psychological, ecological, historical, and social circumstances, but not as an ontological possibility deserving consideration on its own terms. It can recognize alternate modes of engagement while translating them into categories that preserve its authority over what counts as knowledge. This process of translation also bears on the privileged position of vision in the constitution of knowledge. Anthropology and ethnography have historically relied upon observation as a principal means of apprehending their objects, while the vocabulary of cognition itself remains saturated with ocular metaphors. Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism exposes the historical and political asymmetry concealed within such claims to disinterested observation, while Descola’s comparative ontologies make the observer’s own metaphysical commitments available for examination. To preserve an uncoerced plurality of relations against their compulsory translation into a single authoritative register, Vision, along with naturalism, is not faulted for its capacities but for what its hegemonic form entitles it to exclude.

9.3

Entitative space is rarefied, relational space crowded, and it doesn't matter how many people are in the room. It could be a reclusive Greta Garbo or the Brady Bunch family. The treatment of an environment has everything to do with how entitative and relational objects harmonize, and how their unhindered cadence sustains the ritual field. A pathology arises when relational objects consolidate into coercive arrangements and project a simulation of entitative autonomy, constraining entities and determining the terms through which they apprehend themselves and their surroundings. The disturbance extends to the very cognitive apparatus through which they assess their condition. Like a malady affecting an organism's entire nervous system, it interferes with perception, alters self-recognition, and induces a delirium in which the host experiences the nightmare of a pathology as though it were its endemic condition. Within this normalized scheme, abuse travels in one direction, directed at an entity relegated to the receiving end of a relational arc, as though the subject-object split were already an established order of things. Consider the centuries of European naval supremacy that enabled the colonization of continents, and the subsequent unraveling of imperial domination, including its pending dissolution in West Asia, where historical transformations remain difficult for entrenched powers to acknowledge. The perpetrator of harm readily dons the armor of self-defense and, with a medieval knight's vapid countenance, recites a litany of legitimations to entrench its behavior and justify its position. Karma's reckoning is a deep-time operation, despite popular culture's insistence on its instantaneity. Martyrs never get to witness the blooms of their sacrifice. Bloody politicians repeatedly get away with murder. The scapegoat never receives a homecoming celebration; at best, the cold shoulder reserved for a maladjusted foreigner. Since causality permits abuse to be exercised unilaterally, without synchronous consequences, one wonders whether entities are left even or at odds as they tug at opposite ends of their relational arcs. Were the arc an ouroboric circle, the simultaneity of its extremities, brought together in the head swallowing the tail, would unravel the ossified subject-to-object chain of command. The released behavioral vector would no longer fashion one end into a manipulative handle and the other into a lasso, collar, or noose. Neglect and abuse, keeping close company, may travel in one direction, provided time is linear, and the earth is flat. Yet just as thought can instinctively bend to the curvature of space, the crashing waves of history carry an undertow that drags the sandcastles of human deeds back to a pulsing sea, always karmic to those adept at navigating it. Many have mistaken this sea for firm ground, a foundation for colonnades aspiring to scrape the sky. Others imagined they could part its waters for safe passage to a promised land, only to find the ocean floor liquefying beneath their feet. Is it Moby Dick or a Turner frigate caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of entities and their relations? Like a verb ferreting through a deficient vocabulary, speaking in tongues to inform the master narrator that it cannot cross the treacherous distance alone, that its insufficiency cannot be spun into a personality trait, and that the disparity of available resources must not congeal into lack. It takes a certain neutrality to navigate the tempest of lineages battling on the demographic sea, a cool-headed escape valve from the infernal furnace of clashing behaviors. Truth adheres to the blooming scent of error, like an intermittent thought wrestling with the abstract condensation of an angel. He who proposed moving the world with a lever claimed to have found a virgin hill to stand on, from which a sufficiently long shaft would let him punch above his weight. News would travel in one direction, his deeds returning only in the porous echoes of acclaim. With no better measure, his yardstick could scrape the bottom of a sequestered existential tank. The universal claim to neutrality finds its most persuasive image in this Archimedean point, the imagined position of exteriority from which the world might be observed and acted upon without implication in its affairs. Such neutrality may serve as a methodological aspiration but becomes a mystification when an abstract standpoint is mistaken for an actual exemption from the conditions of participation. The ritual field admits no such exteriority. Its neutrality is not the detachment of an observer but the non-prescriptive character of the differentiation through which entities and relations coexist. Neither indifferent to the consequences of their encounters nor committed to a predetermined arrangement, it remains coextensive with the possibilities of their further configurations. Its reality is no less consequential for being virtual, since it holds the possibility of renewed expression even when exploited. Neither prior nor posterior to entitative and relational objects, the ritual field exists in their sustained differentiation. Language and conceptualization may endow it with an independent existence by imposing determinate structures upon what they seek to understand, but its actual frequency cannot foreclose the possibilities of subsequent configurations and enactments.

The technician of this domain, encountered earlier as the translator who mediates relations while preserving entitative integrity, introduces a different kind of neutrality. Situated within the ritual field rather than above it, the translator does not claim exemption from the relations through which interpretation becomes possible. Instead, neutrality consists in the refusal to appropriate what is mediated, recognizing that no relational representation can fully capture the entity it renders intelligible. Translation thus becomes an exercise in differentiation rather than equivalence alone, attentive not only to what can be conveyed across conceptual and experiential boundaries, but also to what resists assimilation. Its task is to prevent the necessary interventions of mediation from hardening into claims of ontological authority. This requires a multidisciplinary diagnostic approach capable of exposing the mystifications fabricated by pseudo-entitative hegemonic formations, which present their contingent arrangements as the necessary order of things. The translator's apotropaic function consists in dislodging these erroneous identifications, interrupting the cognitive appropriation through which coercive arrangements reproduce themselves, and recovering distinctions concealed by relational automation. The objective is not to restore an original harmony or prescribe a perfected culture, but to release capacities for uncoerced participation and renewed differentiation. Such intervention cannot claim the innocence of Archimedean detachment. Its legitimacy depends on answerability within the very field it seeks to clarify, while preserving the breathing gaps between things and their predicates.

A ritual field is the sustained, continuous differentiation of entitative and relational objects. It disappears from cognition when their presumed isometry and homology make them appear interchangeable. What remains perceptible may then be better described as a classroom, ballroom, battlefield, or playground: a determinate arrangement that neither excludes the ritual field nor adequately represents its full dimensionality. The disappearance occurs within the representational perspective of a diseased host whose cognitive faculties have been compromised, but the field persists even when its qualitative differentiation becomes inaccessible to the cognition that apprehends it. As a qualitative frequency, the ritual field is a strict co-production whose expression is interrupted when the distinction between an entity and the relations in which it participates is lost, particularly when their identification becomes seamless. Simulation can thus be defined through the presumed isometry and homology of relational and entitative objects, whereby their structural correspondence is mistaken for identity. The ritual field provides another reason why entities and relations cannot constitute a dualistic structure, as the integrity of each maintains them together, and compromising any dismantles the triplicate principle of objecthood through which they can be properly understood.

9.4

The criticism of Western culture is compromised by the complicity of its practitioners, and there is no point in expecting them to draw the Eveready bunny out of its hat. It comes as no surprise that Albert Camus airbrushes the Arab out of his lucid, read-between-the-lines, existential economy. The academy has long been the cultural outpost of colonial empire, with missionary intellectuals and educational informants, world-class orientalists to be sure, who rarely follow the path of Dances with Wolves in defecting to an estranged indigeneity. Empire always had its pantheon of state philosophers, the Plato and Aristotle, Locke and Hume, Kant and Hegel of whitewashed racial superiority and exceptionalism. It always harbored simultaneous countermeasures, such as thriving countercultures, to both offset and promote its preferences. The tradition of “critical thinkers” in the blazing track of Nietzsche and Heidegger, flaunting its end-game rhetoric with Adorno and Horkheimer, inspires a counterculture that turns out to have been the empire’s border patrol all along. There are also the “nomadic thinkers,” celebrated by Deleuze and Guattari for their alternative lines of flight, who can remarkably keep the dominant order unperturbed. Given its conflicting claims to universality, what must be retained from Western philosophy is not what one intellectual persuasion posits versus another, but what breaks the chain of antagonisms typical of a troubled, self-aware, self-immolating, autophagous culture. Disappointment in counterculture’s shortcomings, and the realization that it does not provide a viable alternative to the dominant order, fall prey to one of the oldest tricks in the book, whereby deploying difference is a proven lure for captivity. Against the brutal backdrop of the Gaza genocide, some have spoken of a “metaphysics of savagery” as the underbelly of Kant’s deontological imperative to act in accordance with universal law. But it is not uncommon to be betrayed by those who venture out of the imperial fortress with the promise of bridging distant lands, only to have tourist visas and return home to boast about their exploits. Much can be said about an allegiance that had to sift through years of acculturation, only to be denied face-to-face by a mentoring figure who does not live up to what it professes. And yet, with no state philosopher or detractor holding the key, the inspiration ought instead to come from the heuristic compilation of their failures. Thus, for all the pomposity that makes Greek thought the cornerstone of Western philosophy, the path followed by the Skeptics may be far more inventive than usually admitted. Beyond the pragmatic benefits, placing critique under a diagnostic, reparative, and preventive methodology has the unsuspected advantage of freeing abstract thought rather than constraining it into erroneous accountability. Philosophy’s genesis of concepts in conjunction with percepts and affects (Deleuze and Guattari) offers such an example that may resist universalization. But at the core of skepticism is a suspension of judgment that allows the physician to exact the appropriate procedure and, with self-effacement, assess mutual resources unsuspected by the conflicting parties. What must be extracted from the coveted history of Western philosophy is precisely what a pathologist would gather from the wealth of its thoroughly documented, turbulent history. Restoring health in this respect would not abide by an ideal that can be recreated, or a state of grace that can be brought back by adhering to a preconception. The outcome remains rightly uncertain, because being at the front trenches of real encounters is unlike a therapy session that brings a disturbance down to the homeostatic calm of a normative condition. An apotropaic practice is guerrilla warfare against the preemptive implementation of coercive measures. It is an immanent, situationist strategy of rehabilitation, and a diagnostic effort towards an equilibrium akin to ecological conservation, which, unlike therapy’s allaying of aftereffects, takes a proactive stance that informs its primary engagements. The rarefied criticism that becomes the superego of the colonial imperial entity is quite simply a calculated chiding that holds together over a blind spot because it has already taken over the place of the other.

Among the luminaries of Western thought, its state philosophers and grand decriers, it is expected that little would be known about Sextus Empiricus, although he left a considerable mark on figures such as Montaigne and Hegel. The obscurity of his life and work contrasts with the enduring influence of a philosophical practice that resisted establishing itself as an authority. Pyrrhonism’s epoché, the suspension of judgment, and ataraxia, the tranquility that may follow, suggest an accomplishment largely overshadowed by Western philosophy’s loftier ambitions. Sextus uses skeptical arguments as medicinal remedies intended to address the condition they are called for rather than to perpetuate their necessity. He brings competing claims into a condition of comparable persuasive force, or isostheneia, to interrupt their pretensions to definitive authority, and, just as importantly, without installing a rival doctrine in their place. Like a purgative that expels itself along with what it removes, the remedy relinquishes its own necessity as it relieves the condition that called for it. It does so by extending its method to its own instruments, preventing the corrective procedure from becoming another source of dogmatic authority. This distinguishes restorative work from the long tradition of cultural critics who sustain an adversarial identity dependent on the pathology they denounce. Ataraxia, by contrast, is less of a victorious conclusion than the disappearance of trouble and freedom from the disturbance caused by dogmatic judgment. Yet Pyrrhonism also belongs to the Western philosophical tradition and is, as expected, susceptible to accommodating authority, settling into a garden-variety of quietism and two-sidedness. However, if any paradigm has remained constant throughout, and by contrast to the critic's state of exemption, applying Pyrrhonism’s principles to itself reveals that what must be retained from its teachings is the ability to let go of one’s authority once the deed at hand is done.

9.5 The abject, or how aesthetics becomes first politics.

Appearance is not what one chooses to look like, but the partial apprehension of an entity by another. It is not an entity’s chosen presentation or an exterior surface concealing an authentic interior. Nor is it entirely produced by the perceiving subject. Rather, appearance arises through the eventful contact of entities whose encounters neither participant can fully determine. Aesthetics concerns the formal arrangement of this confluence, through which certain appearances are favored, stabilized, and perpetuated while others are diminished or excluded. The abject is the residual force of this exclusion, the aesthetic shadow that accompanies the preferred arrangement of objects. It is not the opposite of beauty, nor does it seek redemption through it. The common ground of pulchritude and the abject lies in the irreducibility of what each brings into appearance. Abjection exposes the limitations of a canon that regulates the movement and expression of bodies according to preferred norms, and in doing so, reveals the political character of aesthetic organization and the power to determine not only how things appear, but under what conditions they may participate in a common world. The abject does not petition for admission into beauty to participate in the world, nor must it remain ugly to retain its disruptive capacity. The secret shared by Beauty and the Beast is not that they are identical, but that they both resist reduction to the categories through which they are recognized. Since, as mentioned above, aesthetics organizes the conditions of appearance, it also helps determine what counts as present, legitimate, and worthy of consideration, thus allowing such determinations to precede explicitly political decisions. Before a person is excluded by law, they may already have been rendered socially unrecognizable, threatening, or disposable through certain arrangements of appearance, just as before an object is appropriated, its existence is reduced to a useful image or handy category. When the organization of appearance begins to determine the behavioral patterns of interacting entities, aesthetics reserves the capacity to step forth as a political agent and promote their uncoerced participation.

Kant’s disinterestedness of aesthetic judgment made possible a conception of formal arrangements detached from the conditions in which entities encounter one another. By granting aesthetic judgment independence from any interest in the object's existence, it also furnished aesthetics with an alibi for disregarding the consequences of its own schemes. Even Hannah Arendt's attempt to recover Kantian judgment for political thinking leaves a troubling question unresolved: what is gained by imaginatively considering the standpoint of others when the actual conditions of their participation remain unchanged? Nor is it sufficient to indict the Archimedean standpoint for its supposed neutrality while leaving one's own position of judgment and its exclusions unexamined (regarding Arab and Palestinian indigeneity in her case). Here lies the persistent source of political inertia in contemporary Eurocentric liberalism, where corroborating recognitions have replaced transforming relations. The abject interrupts this complacency, as it neither seeks appreciation nor awaits admission into a more inclusive consensus, exposing the authority exercised through the dominant order of appearances. With its interventions, aesthetics becomes first politics not by extending the privileges of judgment, but by confronting the conditions under which entities are permitted to act, move, and participate in a common world.

Unless it is harnessed into fetishization, the abject resists settling into a permanent iconography. It will not tolerate a representation to legislate the motion of bodies, nor find Parnassian repose among the unsettling friction of contiguous textures and particularities. It may be retrofitted into an instrument of arousal. Still, the abject seeks to undo the aesthetic polarization of beauty and ugliness, which one can then read on a flat scale, like the absorption lines of a spectrum left by specific wavelengths of light. Pivoting around the articulation of form and function, turning them inside out, the abject is the type of intervention that injects Dada back into the commodification of Surrealism, which dissolved a potentially revolutionary movement into mainstream aesthetics for fashion, advertising, and consumer culture. Modernist formal organization, emerging from the clash between religious dogma and rational emancipation, sought to suspend its divergent, mutually antagonistic impulses in the vacuum of the sublime, even as its idols entered their twilight. But at the zenith of etiquette and savoir-faire, Elle Décor magazine's formalism must still negotiate with an incessant metabolic reality that is largely privatized. Meanwhile, the public arena becomes an ontological proscenium, where appearances are legislated according to codes of normative behavior. One might argue that the abject can succumb to the same paradigm that drives the make-up industry. As a safety valve of the dominant order, it might even reinforce its hegemony, since enough adversity can compensate for a system’s homogeneity and contribute to its longevity. However, the abject remains something beauty or the established order cannot entirely expel without compromising themselves.

Je suis belle, ô mortels! comme un rêve de pierre. On beauty’s dreamtime trajectory, begun in Baudelaire’s mineral reverie, we wave at Julia Kristeva, who shines a flashlight on the organic contingency beauty left behind, then salute Jacques Rancière, who helps us consult his map of the partitioned grounds. The latter recognizes that aesthetic arrangements determine what can be seen, heard, and acknowledged in a common world. Still, within this distribution of visibility, our political question extends to the organization of irreducible entities, the relations that surround them, and their co-produced behavioral pattern. Thus, we have situated abjection not so much in subjective repulsion and threatened identity, as in the preferential order of appearances. We have further located these arrangements within the shared field produced by entities and their relations. Looking back at the Vitruvian code that made aesthetics a foundational pillar, along with function and permanence, Venustas, reflecting the cosmic laws governed by mathematics, found its paradigm in the idealized form of the human body, turning its nonhuman counterpart into abjection as it engages in chthonic and carnal negotiations. To the modern subject, the abject continues to manifest in the surplus of neglect, urban decay, and wall-to-wall graffiti, often seeming like a substantive abomination, but unexpectedly and perhaps unwittingly, it behaves as an agent that draws the entitative condensations of beauty back into the relational encounters from which they have been abstracted, ultimately serving entitative integrity. With the irreverence and impetuousness of Dada, exercising the abject is an intervention that does not demand recognition within an established aesthetic order but challenges it to democratize its conditions of participation.

9.6

Reality has a double because humans cannot bear the pain of their existence. All sorts of beliefs and metaphysical systems are propped up to remedy the intolerable notion that it is simply indifferent to whatever one makes of it. Things just are. Brutish, short, or longer than expected with a leviathan around. Clément Rosset does not grant reality a concealed justification. No authentic version of eventuality awaits behind what is encountered, no underlying order redeems its accidents, and no necessary meaning explains why the chips fall the way they do. For Rosset, the Real is idiotic in its refusal to signify anything beyond itself, and the double provides an alternative to what is encountered, a supplementary existence in which the contingencies of the actual may be justified, corrected, or overcome. Reality is intolerable precisely because it does not comply with our demand that existence should account for itself. Thus, doppelganger versions of raw reality abound and collide with ready-made signs and models that increasingly precede, displace, or dispense with their referents. At the other end of the ping-pong table, keeping tabs on the coefficient of reality, Jean Baudrillard laments its hijacking by the rapid advance of simulation. Rosset is undeceived by these copycats with an agenda and has little reason to mourn what cannot disappear. Baudrillard’s repartee is that reality has already jumped over its own shadow. The Jeremiah of the simulacrum invokes an enigmatic world of symbolic exchange lost to the imperatives of total visibility and operational efficiency. Rosset returns the ball with a deceptive serve calibrated by considerably less theatricality. Tintin’s Thompson twins must have gotten to Jean’s head. His proliferating simulations offer an unconvincing cover for the utter absence of the constitutive enmeshment of seduction and reversibility sported in his discourse. After the topspin drive and forehand smash administered by the players, the ball curiously spins on the taut net before falling off the tennis table altogether. Rosset exclaims with joy that this little match with Baudrillard is living proof that, in the latter’s words, “the real has never interested anybody!” The ball, meanwhile, rolls off the scene and enters the cacophonous, contestation-saturated territory of the largely overlooked—metaphor intended—elephant in the room: the human subject's perspective on what reality is or ought to be.

The ping-pong ball bounces through the Musée d’Orsay and comes to a sudden halt midway through, underneath the ominous presence of Gustave Courbet’s A Burial at Ornans. In the painting’s meticulous arrangement, an extraordinary distribution of attention elevates ordinary villagers to the monumental scale formerly reserved for religious and historical figures. Assembled with remarkably little dramatic coordination, no heroic protagonist commands the scene, nor does the religious ritual, metonymized by the cross's vertical insistence against the scene's overwhelming horizontality, offer a passage toward transcendence. The grave interrupts this gathering with disconcerting literalness, reminding the inhabitants of Ornans that although they have acquired the dignity denied to them by conventions, the soil of a palpable earth awaits to engulf them all. In a diagonal recusation of the cross, a hunting dog partakes of the ritual without participating in its symbolic economy, unburdened by the obligation to interpret the proceedings according to their human significance. The hound looks away like many of the humans caught in a dispersed choreography of vacant, grieving, and distracted stares. Its wandering attention sets a tonal key among the assembled mourners, whose distracted gazes and disparate appearances betray a similar susceptibility to the occasion's contingency. In A Burial at Ornans, the ordinary individual acquires the dignity of historical representation amid the circumstances of mortality, while the social ritual unfolds within a geological and biological continuity indifferent to its symbolic authority. In this, Courbet’s realism occupies a peculiar threshold between the monumental affirmation of human existence and its material dissolution. Two of its constitutive tendencies are observational attentiveness and participatory engagement, which he kept in productive tension, no doubt anticipating modern art's divergent yet recurrent tendencies toward perceptual focus, formal reconstruction, and performative enactment. He practiced at once what would become modernism’s oscillations between Impressionism’s instability of observation, adopted by Monet, and Cézanne’s reconstruction of appearance through structural organization. The tension recurs between Abstract Expressionism’s intensification of engagement, where physical activity becomes conspicuous in the work’s formation, and Minimalism’s reconfiguration of the encounter, where formal restraints invite renewed attention to the physical object. Regarding the stylistic specificity of French Realism, Courbet pursued more than a faithful portrayal of his subject matter, challenging the conventions about what is worthy of appearance. Yet in its historical course, the aspirations of the aesthetic movement falter when all bets are placed on representational fidelity to the real. Representation presumes to speak truthfully for the other, but that may amount to little more than conformity to an accepted organization of appearances. In this sense, a Braque might be more realistic than a Rubens because it challenges the presumption that visual coherence is a sufficient measure of reality. Although representation harbors a mimetic susceptibility to influence, an amorous responsiveness to the encountered object that may produce difference through repetition, its duplicity arises from a simultaneous affirmation of identity and separation. Thus, representation can establish an identity across the difference it traverses toward its predicate and usually does. Realism’s core characteristic was the rejection of idealism, yet its subsequent submission to the photographic standard of representational fidelity brought this ambition full circle. As mechanical likeness surpassed its evidentiary value and acquired the authority of objective apprehension, becoming a privileged model of visual veracity, Realism spelled its failure by equating representational conformity with photography's alleged optical truth.

The wandering ball leaves the authority of aesthetic and philosophical disputation to err through other dioramas. Subject to gravity, friction, obstacles, and chance encounters, it becomes in turn the object of concern for a museum attendant, then an elusive plaything for an insistent dog. At some point, it slingshots into pop culture’s pinball machine and bumps its way down a glitzy playfield in a convulsive cascade of light and sound, to the twitching paddles, awaiting the kick that sends the steel ball back to a stellar constellation of kinetic activity. Suffice it to say that, throughout its existential peregrination, our ball has been scrutinized from different angles but was never rolled into a definitive putting hole. Perhaps because a long list of misprisions burdens our understanding of what constitutes reality, beginning with factors that are of the same order as subject-object duality. An account may claim to be purged of idealism while remaining an idealistic concatenation of observable facts. Or it may acknowledge subjective realities while opposing them to an allegedly objective one, itself an integral part of those apprehensions. Everything changes when the object comes first, since such an apprehensive lens refutes both the idea that only subjective reality matters and the notion that objective reality is merely a convention to be either slighted or obeyed as the ultimate authority. Objecthood is the key to reality's multiple registries and defines it as the relational apprehension of an entity’s self and its contextual surroundings. Since an event is apprehended by a multitude of beings, no single agent can claim the sum of the perceptions afforded by their individual apertures, making reality a mosaic whose overview is unavailable to any overseer. Apprehending reality always involves betrayal because it is slighted until it hits us in the face. To run its marathon, one is handed a baton with treason on one end and anagnorisis on the other. Recognition arrives as betrayal because reality fulfills itself by frustrating our imagined version of it. It is no wonder that Clément Rosset came to his idiotic reality through Oedipal treachery and a sudden prise de conscience at its duplicity. Reality is both a given and what we make of it, a bitter pill to swallow, and an acentric arena where entities are prompted by the push and pull they exercise on each other. As a relational apprehension, it extends beyond the modalities of awareness, including sentience and sapience. Reality manifests through mutual human and nonhuman promptings in a dynamism difficult to capture in static terms, providing the basis for the distribution of a shared existential resource. Reality is weird because it has no central command post, but a long list of contending operators, although no one has truly occupied its driver’s seat. It remains overwhelming in its simplicity, a permanent mystery that cannot reside in its myriad interpretations. The expression “the Real” gives a singular designation to something whose manifestations are inexhaustibly multiple, and once nominalized, reality becomes susceptible to being treated as an overarching entity or an ultimate referent. What is generalized through relational investiture acquires the appearance of an entitative singularity, inviting successive interpretations to compete for possession of its meaning. Additionally, representation, reality’s faithful delegate, has disastrous effects when transposed to politics, concocting the very recipe of the oligarchic state. Lest the difference-producing potential of mimesis be put into effect, because the problem to be addressed, equally consequential for anarchic governance, is representation defaulting to identity. When it comes to multiplicity, the proliferation of alternative universes offers a serial arrangement less convincing than the unbounded simultaneity manifested through the coexistence of entities. Objecthood holds that each participant encounters reality through its capabilities. Every encounter generates consequences beyond the capacity of any of them to capture fully, let alone the authority to legislate. Reality is the relational investiture of entities, human and nonhuman, through their immanent and intentional exchanges. When not held up as a mirror one identifies with, it is negotiated among all its participants, and if it offers a ground for commonality, it makes itself only partially available to any given entity.

Ensuring the integrity of entities and their proper differentiation from the relations with which they engage, the patterning sequence referred to as the ritual field provides a way to investigate the relational investiture of reality through the contiguity of entitative objects and the immanent and intentional relational objects implicated in their encounters. Their co-produced behavioral patterns give rise to provisional configurations, asymmetries, and centers of influence whose existence and efficacy remain contingent. The field is anthropo-acentric, and more broadly apocentric, accommodating human and nonhuman participation without an appointed sovereign. Its dynamism includes the emergence of unforeseen relations, the transformation of established arrangements, and the persistence of possibilities exceeding their present expression. The ritual field belongs to reality and participates in its boundlessness. Its investigative reach concerns the behavioral configurations through which coexistence becomes consequential, while reality remains open to occurrences beyond their established patterns and beyond our capacity to anticipate them. The ritual field corrects the entitative condensation of the real, restoring the irreducible plurality of its participants and their relational investments, allowing reality to retain its singular occurrences, its multiple registers of apprehension, and its inexhaustible capacity for surprise.

9.7

When Pascal intuits that the trouble that befalls men comes from their inability to remain calm in a room, he describes a situation in which the entities involved are shoved into a narrow closet, expelling their corresponding relations outwards to collide in an endless brawl. Exposing the treachery from within this arrangement is like eavesdropping on the Virgin Mary chastising baby Jesus as witnessed by Max Ernst and his friends, Breton and Éluard. A sanctified configuration exposes the coercion that operates within it, allowing relations once revered to turn against the figures they are meant to sustain. The scandal might as well be a livestreamed genocide that cannot be brought to a halt lest Europe’s entire colonial history and its conquest of the New World be indicted. Manifest Destiny spelled the eradication of native American populations for the inexorable march of the crepuscular civilizational coalition known as the West. Its ambitions concretized through a cognitive parallax error, christened into a Renaissance whose deployment entailed the decimation of neighboring indigeneity and the abusive management of environmental resources. As current geopolitics, tainted by game-of-Risk intrigue, puts a bandit’s mask on terrestrial biodiversity, low-pitched, sustained, resonant wolf howls across contested lands suggest a more accurate version of events. A decisive catalyst, the wolf is either the ally of a savage in the wilderness or is hunted down along with bandits and suspicious outsiders. The time-honored differentiation between agrarian and hunter-gatherer cultures is the cornerstone of an ecological edifice in shambles, begging closer scrutiny. This distinction is invariably pronounced from a static, sedentary vantage point assumed to be preferential, and its observance is often treated as the fulfillment of a providential promise. Why is the hunter-gatherer always the backdrop of the agricultural farmer, the default primitive state conferred to those outside the archetypal polis? As if one is either inside its civilizing walls, being earnest and taking care of business, or out fussing about in the wilderness, that is when the barbarians are not tacitly awaiting at the gate. Fire tells a different story, as bushmen's sophisticated, controlled handling of it drove the tremendous biodiversity enmeshed in the entanglement of species. It is worlds apart from the ravaging megafires threatening to engulf habitat and the splitting atom that would send a transhuman anomaly wandering through space. The nomad is another case in point. Cast as roaming, peripatetic, or drifting when, in fact, it engages in implicit space-time management that crosses paths with other entities, knowing exactly where it is going and when. Is it any wonder that those sequestered in the comforts of their sedentary fortress have to sustain themselves with permanent wars and distant conquests? It is a perspectival clash when the wolf howls at excessive wool production, and the natives target the colonizer’s livestock for being a nuisance to their maize fields and oyster beds. Lupus in fabula has it that the indigenous and the wolves stood in the way of civilizational improvement and belonged together in the howling wilderness. Biodiversity is the primary economy in an open-ended farm, unbound by the dictates of monoculture. Take the revered buffalo for life’s commissary, a central bank of nourishment and resources, that will transmute eighteen of its hides into the mobile habitat of a tipi, twenty of which will take over three hundred buffalos roaming the landscape to provide a spatial anchor for the clustered clan. The wolves, bison, elk, horses, and countless other creatures that, along with humans, co-authored the entanglement of the American West were homegrown resources that formed a general economy of goods circulated through friction, reciprocal dependence, and continuing adjustment. Compared to the petrodollar and its dependence on an economy consuming buried time, the former arrangement is clearly far more sustainable. To drive the point home, a deep-time perspective immediately reveals the transience of an order its perpetrators deem permanent. The indigenous peoples of the Americas can boast of a longevity unavailable to the reckless colonizers who came and left, in a transitoriness one is incapable of grasping when surrounded by the thick fog of time. The planet is not done digesting the recent crime perpetrated on an entire continent, nor is it done adjusting to the brunt of the human meteor, and the adjudications of its furtive memory. Two decades into the twenty-first century, it isn’t that the Zionists are intentionally overt about the genocide they are perpetrating on the Palestinians, nor that they are going to great lengths to cover it up either. Rather, they are subject to the temporal reflex that eventually releases a forced drowning to bob back up to the surface. And once social media spilled the beans, they turned it into an exercise of utter deniability, the other sinister pincer of suppression. The shock at their shamelessness might stem from the evaporation of the make-believe that things can change when they already have in unexpected ways. With every Zionist settler who disembarked on the land of Palestine, before and after the Nakba, so many natives have been catapulted out to the far reaches of the world, including the writer of these pages, to land in the belly of the beast, or, following what a spatiotemporal objecthood would reveal, on a terrain that has not finished digesting the beast.

The room turns into a slaughterhouse while the skeletons are condemned to hide in the closet. What has been perpetrated on the vastness of the American continent will no doubt go on having global repercussions. Civilization establishes its authority by making its own position appear stationary, central, and destined to endure. From that position, other ways of inhabiting the world become wandering, backwardness, and wild imaginings. But movement itself is a way of knowing and attending a place, and habitation can persist through an organized succession of encounters. News of remote wars and sinking Arabian sands are shuffled in between presidential elections that will consecrate new hegemonic stooges. Geopolitical carousels opine while biodiversity is at the barrel of a gun. Offices change hands, commentaries circulate, distant violence returns as news. Resistance travels in the persistent howl of the wolf, cast as an intruder in its own habitat, against the smokescreen of the backward and unevolved barbarian whose resources have been plundered and whose impoverishment has been turned into a threat. The manufactured culpability embedded in the charge of terrorism follows the logic of starving somebody, only to blame them for causing famine. The civilizational forces, buttressed in their tower of state technicians and intellectual acrobats, believe they can administer the admission price of existence, while humanity’s quest for stellar predominance is sadly fulfilled by the toy figure of E. Musk. But deep time brings the temporal extension of objecthood into proximity and discloses that indigenous agriculture and mobility already belonged together before the polis traced roads with its armies. A place is inhabited through recurring movements of departure and return, grazing and hunting, planting and harvesting. Within this context, the wolf is the catalytic agent that brings the imbrication of species into dialogue with humans. Yet down the line, this inherited relation becomes legible chiefly through possession. As dog owners walk their pets, the leash stretching between them becomes a hyphenation in a language that has now become foreign. Although qualified as ownership, the relational object harks back to a symbiotic link, atrophied into the atavistic remnant of a once vital contract between human and lupine entities. Donna Haraway reminds us that difficult inheritances are part of what our contemporary affection for dogs must learn to acknowledge, thus complicating the suggestion of an innocent alliance. Herding canines have accompanied labor incentives, ranching, colonial expansion, and predator exclusion. But equally important is that humans, too, have been escorted, guided, and transformed. The hyphen remains active as the dog redirects the walk, interrupts the schedule, solicits attention, and introduces an unsuspected destination to the itinerary. As the civilizational fortress counterbalances its colonial footprint with its repressive dungeons, the distant yet still audible howl of the wolf intimates that reality is a theatre with no director, only actors, including the stage.

9.8

The attractor is a repository of returnless investments, a safety box of cultivated attention. Those who succumb to its influence may feel manipulated or embrace it as a model to emulate. The fundamental poly-symmetry that defines the contiguity of beings and marks their irreducible singularity becomes a stage for a relational centipede that crawls out in the silent absence of entities. The attractor radiates its attributes with the undifferentiated generosity of the sun. Midway between an affirmation of self and the stretch of desire, seduction makes a pact with generality and puts into circulation the cover-girl face that, era after era, has served the civilizational enterprise of launching a thousand ships. In a conflagration of intent, appearance is cast like a fishnet to rein in schools of beguiled entities. With no specific recipient, it becomes an irresistible magnet for those willing to wager on its promise of plenitude. Thus, a person can gather what circulates and broadcast it as evidence of who they are, just as they can radiate pulchritude and draw another into an orbit they never intended. The appearance of self-sufficient beauty may acquire tremendous organizational power, commanding the attention of those who encounter its force, regardless of the attractor’s particular existential contingencies. Unrequited love exposes the rift between the reality of an attachment and the representations through which desire seeks an ultimate correspondence with its object. A social caterpillar may likewise grow into a terminal pupa that crawls out of indiscriminate Instagram scrolls, trailing a chain of evacuated entities that define themselves through their prized collection of relational trophies. In that hundred-legged lucubration of classical French literature, Racine’s Andromaque gives this relational centipede an archetypal body, each of whose segments joins two beings pulled in different directions. Oreste is smitten by Hermione, who loves Pyrrhus, who burns with desire for Andromaque, who remains faithful to her beloved Hector. The plot stretches between two absent figures: Hector at one end and his son, Astyanax, whose life is in jeopardy, on the other. The protagonists’ affections flow in only one direction and meet adversity or contempt in reverse. Oreste enters the relational corridor of his own accord, fully aware that Hermione’s desire lies elsewhere. He trades the self-sufficiency of his being for the pipe dream of a conflagration that might consume their aching separateness. He experiences the attachment as the organizing event of his existence, while for Hermione it is peripheral, if not a burden or intrusion. Dominant in one relation and supplicant in another, she commands Oreste’s fate while surrendering to Pyrrhus, passing her affliction on to Oreste. Pyrrhus carries the pattern one link further, with the resources of a king. He can decide whether Astyanax lives, yet he must wait upon the affection of Andromaque, the woman he holds captive. She goes to the altar to bind him by his oath to protect her son, intending then to join Hector in death. The chain of unrequited desire reaches its dead end, but the relations it has set in motion converge on a child. To the Greeks, Astyanax is already Troy's avenger. Andromaque wagers her life on his survival, leaving him time to outlive their prediction. Mother and child survive. But when Oreste delivers Pyrrhus's death as his ultimate relational trophy, Hermione receives it as the demise of the only man she loves, then takes her own life. L’enfer, c’est les autres! In Racine’s relay, as in Sartre’s Huis clos, each lover seeks a definition of the self from someone whose attention is already elsewhere. Garcin, executed after trying to flee during wartime, needs Inès to believe he is no coward. Estelle, who drowned her infant, seeks reassurance through Garcin’s desire. Inès, who tormented her lover in life, sees through Garcin and burns with desire for Estelle. In a Situationist pastiche, The Devil in Miss Jones does one better and splices Huis clos into an Instagram Ferris wheel. Garcin is out in the corridor. The door stays shut. He bends to the keyhole and catches Estelle and Inès locked in an amorous embrace. He waits for one of them to acknowledge his presence by looking at the door. Even a spiteful glance would satisfy him, but they're so absorbed in each other that neither woman seems to care. Estelle has turned the desire he belittled toward the woman whose approval he desperately sought, and Inès has found fulfillment with the woman he repudiated. Pressed against the door, he can see almost everything but is left out of the loop. His protected yet inconsequential gaze becomes the true measure of his desertion. Behind the door, Estelle says something he cannot make out. Inès bursts out laughing. Garcin presses his eye harder against the keyhole, as though a better view could get him back into their favor. He thinks he would have rather died fighting. Still bent to the door, he mumbles to himself that hell is not the company of others but the penalty of skirting the battle.

9.9

An ardent defender and advocate of critique, Edward Said peregrinates cultural exile through the peripatetic mappings of a Traveling Theory. Groundbreaking ideas can lose their focus and integrity the further they move from their historical ground. Indiscriminate world tours domesticate a theory, but the terrain's intricacies bring dissonance, difficult form, and unresolved contradiction, in attunement with Adorno’s ponderings on Beethoven’s Late Style. Countering the promise of harmonious continuity and the repose of an adjusted denouement, inherited conventions can flare up as uneasy fragments that refuse to reconcile within an organic whole. What survives is an exacerbated consciousness that cannot restore life’s casualties to their former unity. At the edge of Western discourse's endgame rhetoric and hopelessly bound by his European horizon, Adorno pins his last confidence on the notion that “What has been cogently thought must be thought in some other place and by other people”. As Beethoven’s Ninth symphony bursts into chorus, thought can recover its vigor and become praxis in its own right, keeping open the possibilities of what cannot yet materialize. Thus, to avoid the perils of compulsive reasoning and unreflective activism which can easily be absorbed by the existing order, conceptual buoys are called upon to mark the confines of the cultural expanse. Leaving it to those excluded by his formulation to continue writing poetry after Auschwitz, an alternative to resignation is possible. Travel may still reactivate a theory when a new terrain discloses unresolved tensions. Twining the motion with his spatial sense of critical theory, Said’s contrapuntal mapping of intellectual territory nevertheless presses for more intervention and direct public responsibility. But while these paths are known and renewed by situated practices, the crepuscular, lonesome course of Western critique leaves in its wake an alternative topophilia, in which the map must be both faithful to the territory and wary of Borges’ land-swallowing cartography. In distant echoes of radically different forms of stewardship that nurture songlines and dreaming tracks, vital routes follow ancestral pathways that hold and transmit knowledge through story, song, and dance. Pinpointing the particularities of a context while remaining attentive to its contiguities and contingencies, itineraries of situated knowledge delineate cultural trails of apprenticeship and obligation. But it is not a boogie down Broadway Street. Among the origins of the latter and every other thoroughfare, an age of conquest went to the Anthropos’ head. It triggered a shift in perspective that birthed the modern-day individual hegemon. The humanist vocation ushered in by the European Renaissance might as well have skipped a few centuries to land on its logical conclusion: an evolutionary bifurcation into post- and trans-humanism. Yet all roads lead to an epistemological Rome, and the entrepreneurial acculturation went to bed, missionary-style, with its own institutionalization. A key factor was presenting history as an additive, linear process, when much of it is retrograde and only marks the deterioration of time-honored accomplishments. Thus, the self-appointed label of humanism follows the ineluctable course of its unraveling. From the perspective of neutrinos and bacteria, “Human” qualifies the singular amalgam of mineral, vegetal and animal from which the Anthropos emerges. As a self-referential utterance, however, it is doomed to fail as both an overstatement and an erasure. The identitary redundancy of humanism is in shambles, but the ideal is still flagged around like a promise of salvation, even when the defense of identity loses its objective reference and becomes one’s word against another’s. By allowing the world to define humans rather than strictly the other way around, we invite other species to interpret us as well. Self-referential humanism may then dissolve into a manifold of multi-speciesism. At this juncture, objecthood presents us with the fourth dimension of time in its immanence. In this perspectival shift, space no longer polarizes into inside and outside, or self and others, within a three-dimensional framework. The object does not proceed toward an evolutionary and teleological end but toward an encounter with other objects and the subsequent outcomes of that exchange. Despite a tyranny of balanced arguments, humanism does not add up to how the Anthropos treats its own species or the multitude of others it is enmeshed with. What began as a mercantile proposition and became a timeworn profession hangs a bleak lantern in the shadowy cathedral of its distorted grandeur. On the streets of Paris in Fall of 2026, Victorine, distant granddaughter of Delacroix’s Marianne, who wore her Phrygian cap and led the people to the noble goals of reason and freedom, exercises her valued mix of cultural researcher and magazine reporter. She giddily drafts her missive on the outburst of civil unrest and unbridled protest, exclaiming that “the demonstrations are turning every sign-bearer into a thinker and director of their own anger, without undermining the collective in any way.” She invokes Gramsci’s distinction between a war of position and a war of movement, reminding her audience that since direct confrontation invariably triggers state repression, positioning is a long-term struggle equivalent to the changes in public opinion. As with a hostage population, one wonders what else Gramsci would have proclaimed from his prison cell, but the force of symbolic victory. The litany of his monsters lurking between a dying order and one that struggles to see the light of a new day dissipates with the realization that all these deliberations still reek of Hegelian dialectics and its teleological programming of history. For when it comes to the notion of the last judgment that has been introjected in each individual, it appears that it is no more than an acculturating tool beholden to the evolution of subjectivity, its self-definition and representation, rather than nurturing the encounters with what it does not possess and has no ultimate control over. The evolutive paradigm in which the Western subject of history faces its trials and tribulations, convinced it can bring it all together under its enlightened aegis, is tested by the unfiltered reality of interobjective encounters. This implies that humanity’s definition of itself cannot reach definitive, self-contained closure. Addressing the internecine struggles that reflect its abuses of an environment it shares with countless companion species—and possibly resolving them—humanity’s true revolutionary movement consists not in the transcendental status of its identity, nor in a profession representative of pupils who do not question the curriculum, but quite demonstrably in how each of humanity’s objective parts moves and interacts with the others.

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